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ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF

CA~E

While the Statement of the Case contained in appellants Brief contains an abstract of a substantial part
of the evidence received at the trial, much of the material
evidence favorable to the respondent is omitted and
considerable of the evidence which is abstracted is so
recited as to give it a meaning more favorable to the
appellant than the evidence, when considered as a whole,
is entitled to. For the respondent to abstract the entire
testimony would probably tend to confuse rather than
clarify the matters at issue. We believe the court will be
better able to evaluate the evidence and determine the
issues which divide the parties if the respondent confines
this, his additional statement of the case, to those matters which have been omitted from appellant's statement
of the case and the evidence which respondent believes
appellant has misconstrued.
Appellant in his Brief under the heading Statement
of Facts states its position, and as we understand it,
contends:
1. That the decision of the Trial Court should not
be given the weight usually accorded to such court
because of the long delay which lapsed between the
time the case was tried and the time it reached its
decision.

2. That the evidence does not show that the plaintiff has established any right whatsoever to the waters
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fron1 Duck Creek because it is not shown that water
was applied to the lands for which a water right is
claimed prior to 1903.
3.

That the respondent having been awarded the

water "\Yhich finds its way into Duck Creek below what
is referred to in the evidence as the Duck Creek Dam,
he should not be awarded any water which is diverted
at the Duck Creek Dam and diverted through the ditches
leading therefrom to the lands which he is under contract to purchase.

-t

That the appellant has not shown that he has any

right to any water right divertable at the Duck Creek
Dam or any right to divert any water through the ditches
leading from such dam to his land.
5.

That the appellant has a right to a flow of be-

tween four and ten second feet of water through the
ditches leading from each of the two dams that divert
water from Duck Creek.
6.

That it is impracticable to carry out the terms

of the Decree entered by the court below.
In the course of our Additional Statement of the
Case and argument, we shall attempt to direct the attention of the Court to the evidence which amply supports
the Decree appealed from.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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THE TRIAL COURT WAS SUPPLIED WITH A TRANSCRIPT OF THE EVIDENCE AND IT VIEWED THE PREMISES INVOLVED IN THE CONTROVERSY.

Appellant directs the attention of the court to the
fact that the trial court had this case under advisement
for more than four years after the trial was had and
before a decision was reached. Respondent certainly is
not going to argue that such a long delay is justifiable,
but the respondent having been deprived of the water
to which he was entitled during those years, he should
not also be penalized because of the delay. \Vhen the
trial court, over objections of the respondent and appellant, ordered that new parties be brought in, it became
necessary to secure a transcript of the evidence received
at the original trial as otherwise the new parties brought
in were not advised of what the evidence consisted of
and, of course, could not be bound thereby. The new
parties who were brought in pursuant to the order of
the court consented that the evidence received at the
original trial might be received as to them if a transcript
were furnished and they be given an opportunity to
refute any of such evidence. Pursuant to such arrangement, a transcript was prepared (See Tr. Vol. III, page
830) and paid for by respondent and appellant and a
copy thereof furnished to the court. Thus the trial court
had available a complete record of the proceedings from
which it could refresh its memory.
Moreover, in cases such as this where the trial court
views the premises in controversy, the rule that proper
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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weight should be g-i,Ten to the fact that the trial court
has a better opportunity to arriYe at the truth than does
the reviewing court is especially applicable. \Vhile the
view of the premises is not in and of itself evidence, it
serYe~ to enable the COlEt to understand and give proper
weight to evidence as to any physical condition of the
premises which are in dispute. To illustrate, there was
some conflict in the evidence as to whether certain ditches
on the property of the plaintiff were irrigation or drain
ditches. If by a view of the premises it appeared that
the ditches ·were on the high ridges running through the
property of the plaintiff, such fact would be convincing
proof that the same were for use in irrigation and not
for drainage purposes. So also, if old ditches were so
located that they would serve no useful purpose except
as a means of irrigating plaintiff's land, such fact would
add considerable weight and might well justify the trial
court in making a finding that otherwise would not be
justified by the cold record of the evidence. That the
trial court viewed the premises is made to appear from
the record. Tr. Vol. II, page 823.
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS WITHOUT CONFLICT THAT
THE PREMISES OF THE PLAINTIFF WERE IRRIGATED
WITH WATER DIVERTED FROM DUCK CREEK AT THE
DUCK CREEK DAM AND COURSED THROUGH THE
DITCHES LEADING TO HIS LAND LONG BEFORE 1903.

In the Statement of the Case and elsewhere in the
Brief, appellant makes the statement that the land of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
the plaintiff was not irrigated until1906 and that therefore the plaintiff has completely failed to establish any
right whatsoever to any of the water of Duck Creek.
It may be worthy to note that the law of 1903 is not
as exacting as counsel s~ems to contend. Section 72 of
Chapter 100 of the Act of 1903 expressly provides that
the repeal of the former law shall not effect any valid
water right and that any water right initiated under
the provisions of the law theretofore existing may be
perfected in the same manner and with like effect as if

such law had not been repealed. Prior to 1903, one
could appropriate water by merely going upon a stream
and diverting the water therefrom and putting it to a
beneficial use. If, however, one desired to have a right
when perfected relate back to a fixed time to prevent
intervening claimants from acquiring a prior right, it
was the practice to give notice of intention to appro-priate a specified amount of water. However, the giving
of such notice was not necessary to a valid appropriation. An appropriation may be initiated by an intention
to appropriate water for some useful purpose accompanied by some open physical demonstration of the
intent. Elliot v. Whitmore, et al., 23 Utah 342; 65 Pac.
70. Patterson v. Ryan, 37 Utah 410; 108 Pac. 1118.
Deseret v. Hooplania, 66 Utah 251; 239 Pac. 479. Jensen
v. Birch Creek Ranch, 76 Utah 356; 289 Pac. 1097. In
this case, however, there is no necessity to resort to the
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doctrine announced in the cases just cited to support the
view that water was appropriated for the irrigation of
a substantial part of plaintiff's land long before 1903.
Ray Stevens, who owned the land or a substantial part
of the land, upon which plaintiff claims a water right, from
1906 to 19:24, testified that he has been familiar with
the lands for the last forty or fifty years, Tr. 6. That
other than what he referred to as the Korth Extension
Ditch, he has been acquainted \vith the ditches ever since
he was ten years old. Tr. 14. That he was 60 years old
in 19±6 at the time he so testified. Tr. 15. That the
ditches other than the north extension ditch were old
ditches when he first became acquainted with them. Tr.
14-15. That during the time the old ditches were in existence, he has known water to be coursed through them to
the lands below. Tr. 15. It will be noted that the ditches
referred to in the testimony just mentioned, are ditches
leading from the Duck Creek Dam; that the ditches leading to the land of plaintiff were there in 1906, but some
of them have been straightened out. Tr. 22.
William Betts, a witness called by the plaintiff, testified that he was 72 years of age. That in March 1886 he
worked for Orange Warner, who was then living on the
A. J. Stewart ranch; that he worked for A. J. Stewart on
his property from November 1, 1886 until November
1887. That A. J. Stewart owned the property down there
and was operating the same. Tr. 178. That water was
diverted from the Benjamin Slough or Bear Creek at
what has been referred to as the Duck Creek Dam, Tr.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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179. That the dam was made with poles and slabs and
1nanure and the water diverted in a northwest direction
for a distance and then straight west; that the water was
coursed west of the Jackson Stewart home and then
used to irrigate some oats and potatoes; that it runs
west eight acres (rods) or better. Tr. 180. (The Stewart home was at or near the northeast corner of Section
31 and the northwest corner of Section 29. Tr. 358).
That the ditch extended about eighty rods west of the
Jackson Stewart barn and home. Tr. 181.

A. J. Stewart was called as a witness by the defendant and testified in part as follows : That he would be
83 years of age in September. Tr. 356. That he has
been acquainted with the Banjamin Slough since he
was 11 years old. Tr. 356. That in about 1880 or 1885
ditches were constructed to irrigate the land where
there were meadows that had theretofore been flooded.
Tr. 382. That A. J. Stewart, Sr. and A. J. Stewart, Jr.
owned and operated their lands in common until after
1885; that they irrigated about 40 acres of land; that
of the land irrigated, 10 acres was west of the highway.
Tr. 374. That he had seen some of the ditches on the
property in controversy just before the trial and they
were at the same location as they were when he first
went down in that territory. Tr. 158. That water to
irrigate the land shown on the map, plaintiff's Exhibit
A, was secured by commingling the water from the springs
north of Payson and the water diverted out of Duck
Creek at the Duck Creek Dam. Tr. 474-488-490. That
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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there was about 100 or 75 acres irrigated with water
frmn those sources. (It will be noted that the land indicated by the blue and black on plaintiff's Exhibit A is a
part of the land being purchased by the plaintiff for
which he claims a water right.)
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE WATER
WHICH COMES FROM THE SPRINGS NORTH OF PAYSON
IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR THE IRRIGATION OF THE
EASTERLY PART OF PLAINTIFF'S LAND AND THEREFORE, IF RESPONDENT IS DEPRIVED FROM SECURING
WATER DIVERTED AT THE DUCK CREEK DAM, THE
EASTERLY PART OF HIS PROPERTY WILL BE RENDERED VALUELESS.

It is asserted in appellant's Statement of Facts and
repeated in its argument that the water from the springs
arising to the north of Payson which finds its way into
Duck Creek between the Duck Creek Dam and the Stevens Dam is sufficient to supply respondent's needs. It
is also repeatedly asserted that the water available
from the springs north of Payson flows about two second
feet.
Ray Stevens, one of plaintiff's witnesses, did estimate that about one and a half or two second feet of
water finds its way into Duck Creek from spr.ings arising
north of Payson City. Tr. 87. However, actual measurements made by Elmer Jacob, a witness called by the
defendant, show that on June 16, 1946, there was 1.13
cubic feet per second available at the Stevens Dam. Tr.
422. That was the total quantity of water that accumuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lated in Duck Creek below the Duck Creek Dam and
above the Ntevens Dam. That rneasurement was made
within a few days after there had been a heavy rainstorm so that the water at the Stevens Dam was in all
probability above the normal amount. It is made to
appear that on the preceding June 4th, there was an estimated ten second feet of water passing the Stevens Dam
and that the flow had recently been much more, Tr. 297298. No claim is or could successfully be made by the
defendant con1pany that it ever had any interest in or
claim to the water \vhich finds its way into Duck Creek
below the Duck Creek Dam. That water cannot be delivered by gravity flow to the stockholders of the defendant company because the lands of the stockholders of the
defendant company are higher in elevation than the
water in Duck Creek below the Duck Creek Dam. Moreover, at the trial, counsel for the defendant company
stated that the company made no claim to such water.
Tr. 19.
Moreover, by the Decree appealed from, the parties
are limited to four acre feet per annum on the lands
involved in this controversy. If the water which finds
its way into Duck Creek below the Duck Creek dam
exceeds four acre feet for the land irrigated from that
water, the plaintiff is not awarded any water above that
amount. At this point we digress to observe that we find
it extremely difficult to follow the argument of appellant
that it should be awarded a flow of four cubic feet per
second to supply the land of the stockholders of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
defendant cmnpany who divert water fro1n the upper
dam to irrigate the about 100 acres of land irrigated
frmn that source. and at the san1e tin1e contend that less
than one-third of that mnount, that is 1.13 second feet,
is ample to irrigate an equal amount of land which is
being irrigated by plaintiff with water diverted at the
Stevens Dmn. "\Ye shall presently have more to say
about this unusual contention in connection with the
evidence touching the amount of water awarded to the
defendant company.
~\t

this point, suffice it to say, the trial court awarded
to the plaintiff only such water as defendant's witness,
Elmer Jacob, testified was necessary to supply such land
with a proper quantity of water. :Mr. Jacob testified in
part as follows: After having qualified to testify as an
expert he stated: "Well, I think a reasonable duty there
would be seventy acres to the second foot delivered at the
land based upon the flow of water; that is the amount
allowed by the State Engineer in his certificate * * *."
"Well, I think seventy would be a reasonable duty,
seventy acres to the second foot. It is a heavy clay
ground and the surface would not be heavy and the land
will hold water very well." Tr. 433. On cross examination, he stuck to his opinion that the duty of water on
the land here involved is a second foot to seventy acres.
On cross-examination he was asked the following
questions and gave the following answers :
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Q.

If the water is only available for a part of
the year, would you need more than or less
than one second foot to seventy acres of land
where you only had water a part of the time.

"A.

It wouldn't make any difference, if you have
an excess of water and we have a drouth
later on, I am trying to answer your question
as I understand it,-and with your drouth
after the first of July, if you pour water
into prior to that time, the only thing that
you can follow up is your ground water and
when that is gone, the drouth will destroy
the crops later on. Now the water that was
available earlier than July first, that is water
under the bridge. If you don't get it after
July first, your crop will die. It wouldn't
matter if you had a duty as lot (large) as
ten acres to the second foot, if you don't get
any after that, you can't raise a late crop."
Tr. 437-438.

Mr. Jacob upon being recalled testified that the
land here involved could get along with about four acre
feet per acre per annum. Tr. 642. It will be noted that if
we take Mr. Jacob's measurement of the flow of Duck
Creek below the Duck Creek Dam at 1.13 second feet and
the area irrigated from the Stevens Dam at 100 acres,
there would be less than one second foot of water available for 70 acres of land. It would seem that no useful
purpose will be served by further argument on this phase
of the case because the defendant may not be heard to
complain about the award of the water arising in Duck
Creek below the Duck Creek Dam because such water
is not available to it and in effect it has disclaimed any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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right to such water. There see1ns to be no issue of fad
or of law with respert to that water. Even if there
should be sufficient or n1ore than sufficient water finding
its way into Duck Creek below the Duck Creek Dam,
such fact could not affect plaintiff's right to divert water
from the Duck Creek Dam to irrigate land which must
be irrigated with water diverted at the Duck Creek Dam.
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT IN EXCESS OF 68
ACRES OF PLAINTIFF'S LAND WAS, AT THE TIME AND
Tll\IES INVOLVED IN THIS CONTROVERSY, IRRIGATED
FROM WATER DIVERTED FROM DUCK CREEK AT THE
DUCK CREEK DAM.

It is asserted in appellant's Statement of Facts that

the evidence shows that only thirty acres of grain has
been irrigated by the predecessors in interest of the
plaintiff with water diverted from Duck Creek at the
Duck Creek Dam. Of course, no one claims that there
was sufficient water available at all times, or for that
matter at any time, during the summer season to irrigate all of the land that had at times been devoted to
raising cultivated crops. There was not sufficient water
for the land which was irrigated from the upper dam
and which was, at the time of the incorporation of the
defendant company, awarded two shares of water to each
acre of land. See testimony of Mrs. Hickman. Tr. Vol.
I, page 390-392. There is much other evidence to the
same effect and it is so alleged in the pleadings of the
parties and in the trial court's findings. R. 193, Finding
26.
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If, as the evidence shows, there was not sufficient
water to irrigate the land under the upper dam with
two share1-> to the acre, it follows that less than one-half
of the land which the court found had been devoted
to the raising of cultivated crops with water diverted
from the lower or Duck Creek dam could be irrigated
in any season with one share of water allotted to it pursuant to the Articles of Incorporation of the defendant
company. In other words, of the approximately 200
shares of water right in defendant company which was
allotted to irrigate the approximately 100 acres of land
irrigated from the water diverted from the upper dam,
it follows that less than one-half of the 200 acres of
land owned by the stockholders of the defendant company
which the court found had been devoted to raising cultivated crops could have been irrigated in any given year
with the slightly in excess of 200 shares that were, by the
Articles of Incorporation of the defendant company,
allotted to landowners who irrigated their land from
water diverted at the lower or Duck Creek Dam.
We have heretofore indicated in this Brief that the
defendant company cannot well be concerned with the
water which finds its way into Duck Creek below the
Duck Creek Dam and above the Stevens Dam. If, as
defendant company contends, there is an average flow
of two second feet available below the Duck Creek Dam
for irrigation, the plaintiff under the Decree would have
used all of the water to which he is entitled by the use
of that water. Thus, Mr. Jacob, the defendant comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
pany's expert witness, testified and the court found that
four aere feet per acre is the duty of water on the land
here involYed and that the irrigation season extends
for a period of probably six months or about 184 days.
Two second foot of water will flow approximately 736
acres of water in an irrigation season of six months
which it will be noted is more water than was awarded
to the plaintiff to irrigate the land which is irrigated
from the Stevens Dam. R. 205. In any event, such water
is not available to the defendant company, and as we
have pointed out, the defendant company at the trial in
effect disclaimed all right to such water.
The controversy thus resolves itself to the amount
of land that the plaintiff should be awarded a water
right to irrigate with water diverted out of Duck Creek
at the Duck Creek Dam. The total area covered by the
contract to purchase by the plaintiff consists of 387.75
acres. See plaintiff's Exhibit D 2.
Touching the amount of land irrigated by plaintiff's
predecessor in interest, Edward Ray Stevens, out of
water diverted at the Duck Creek Dam, he testified that
one hundred acres was irrigated from the Stevens Dam.
Tr. 21. That about one-half of the 47¥2 acre piece marked
in green on the map was irrigated out of the Stewart
Ditch which diverts water from the Duck Creek Dam;
that he has watered that land every year since 1906;
that all of the ditches on the lands in controversy were
there in 1906, but some have been straightened out.
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Tr. 22. That he has irrigated one-half of the 47¥2 acres
shown on the map, plaintiff's Exhibit A, from water
diverted from Duck Creek Dam ever since he acquired
the property in 1906. That he has irrigated through
the north ditch ever since he owned the property; that
the two ditches were used to irrigate about 100 acres.
Tr. 24; that about 175 acres of the portion marked in
red has been irrigated out of the ditches leading from
the Duck Creek Dam. Tr. 26. That out of the ditch
that is used to irrigate one-half of the 47¥2 acres, is
also used to irrigate about 40 acres marked in red. That
is irrigated out of the ditch marked Old Stewart Ditch,
but there is probably not quite 40 acres; that he irrigated about 20 acres out of the other Stewart Ditch. Tr.
28. After a Mr. Wilson testified, Mr. Stevens was recalled and in order to clear up his testimony, he further
testified : That he irrigated out of the South Stewart
Ditch 23 to 25 acres. Tr. 50. That he irrigates an additional 10 acres out of that ditch, and about one-half to
two-thirds of another piece of about 50 acres or about
30 or 35 acres. Tr. 52. That he irrigated about 30 acres
out of the second ditch. Tr. 54. That he irrigated approximately 80 acres out of the most northerly ditch. Tr.
54. Mr. Stevens further testified that during the time
he owned the lands in controversy, he raised wheat,
barley, oats and meadow hay. Tr. 63. That he usually
planted thirty to forty acres in grain; that two years
he had 80 acres in grain that were irrigated out of water
diverted from the Duck Creek Dam. Tr. 64. That he
irrigated meadow hay out of water diverted from Duck
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Creek Dam. Tr. 65. That he irrigated about 80 acres
of grain fr01n the Stevens Dam. That at one time he had
70 acres of alfalfa that was irrigated out of the Stevens
Dam. Tr. 72. That since the Benjamin drain was put
in you can't raise grain without water. Tr. 67. Mr.
Stevens further testified that he raised 150 to 200 tons
of hay in the dry year of 1934. That when the water
got down to two second feet, he did not attempt to use
any water. Tr. 90. That after the drain was constructed,
he got some of that water. Tr. 91.
During the direct examination of Edward R. Stevens
an attempt was made to show that when the Duck Creek
Irrigation Company was formed he was asked to join
that company, but such evidence was rejected because
Andrew Stewart who asked him to join was dead. Tr.
141. However, later on cross-examination the information was brought out. Tr. 156. Mr. Stevens further
testified that no one questioned his right to the use of
water diverted from the Duck Creek Dam until about
1942 or 1943. Tr. 58-59.
Howard Stevens, a son of Edward R. Stevens, who
was the owner of part of the property for which the
plaintiff had a contract of purchase and for which a
water right was claimed, Tr. 206, testified in part as
follows : That on numerous occasions he helped the
Tucker boys, Ren Stewart, and Lavar Curtis clean out
the ditch referred to in the evidence as the Stewart
Ditch. That he also helped clean out the ditch marked
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Stewart Ditch No. 2. Tr. 207-208. That he did work
on the ditches every spring; that he was 34 years old
at the time of the trial, Tr. 205, and he remembered
those ditches as far back as he could remember; that is
since he was six or eight years old. Tr. 209. That water
was diverted through the ditches that he has mentioned
during each and every year as far back as he can remember and that so far as he knew no one ever questioned
the right of the witness and his father to use the ditches
and the water that was used; that the water used
through those ditches came from the Duck Creek Dam.
Tr. 210. That there was 83 or 84 acres in one tract, about
50 acres in another tract and about 10 or 11 acres
in another tract irrigated with water diverted at the
Stevens Dam. Tr. 211. That about 23 or 24 acres of
·the land marked in green, and about ten acres of the
land of the south part of that painted red, and ten acres
of meadow was irrigated from the South ditch that
diverts water from Duck Greek. That the lands that
are irrigated with water diverted at the Duck Creek
Dam cannot be irrigated with water diverted at the
Stevens Dam. Tr. 212; that about 35 acres of land was
irrigated from the next ditch to the north, that is the
ditch marked Stewart Ditch No.2 on the map, plaintiff's
Exhibit A. Tr. 213. That about 90 acres was irrigated
with water diverted through the most northerly ditch
diverting water from the Duck Creek Dam. Tr. 214.
That meadow hay, wheat, barley, oats and in later years
alfalfa was raised on the land, and from 125 to 200 head
of cattle were fed on the property. Tr. 217.
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THE EYIDENCE SHO\VS THAT PLAINTIFF'S PREDECESSORS HAVE USED THE DITCHES LEADING FROM
THE DUCK CREEK DAl\I, UNDER CLAIMS OF RIGHT,
TO CO~YEY "TATER TO PLAINTIFF'S LANDS FOR MORE
THA~ A HALF CENTURY AND THAT PLAINTIFF'S PREDECESSOR, A. H. RALEIGH, 'VAS ON DECEMBER 23, 1896
AWARDED SCCH RIGHT, TOGETHER WITH A RIGHT TO
SO:'IIE OF THE WATERS OF DUCK CREEK OR BENJAMIN
SLOUGH.

There was received in evidence the files in the case
of A. H. Ra~eigl1 v . .A. J. Steu·art, Jr. et al., Case No.
56. Tr. 817. It will be seen from the Decree entered
in that case that A. H. Raleigh was awarded all of the
waters of certain designated springs up to July first.
It further appears from the findings that "the plaintiff
and defendants are each entitled to some water from
\Yhat is known and described in the pleadings as The
Slough or Slough Springs, but is not able to find from
the testimony submitted the amount each or any of the
parties are entitled to." It will further be noted that
the 100 acres of land upon which such water was to be
used for irrigation consists of the southeasterly part of
the land to which plaintiff claims a water right.
An examination of plaintiff's Exhibit A and defendants' Exhibit 2 shows the location of the ditches leading
from the Duck Creek Dam at the time of the trial. It
will be seen from both of the maps that all of the branches
of the ditch that lead from the lower dam extend to the
lands of the plaintiff. In light of the fact that the territory involved in this controversy slopes towards the
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northwest, it is very significant that these ditches are
all constructed to the lands of the plaintiff. Of course
if these ditches were of recent construction there might
be some merit to defendants' contention that plaintiff
has not established a right to the use of the same, but
~ueh is not this record. Mr. Edward R. Stevens testified
that the ditches have been where they were at the time
of the trial as long as he can remember or since he was
ten years old, except for some slight changes. (He was
60 years old at the time of the trial and he purchased
part of the property now being purchased by the plaintiff
in 1906). The ditches were old ditches when he first
becan1e acquainted with them. That Andrew Stewart
Sr. was the principal owner of the land over which
the ditches ran when he first became acquainted with
that territory. Tr. 14.
\V e have heretofore directed the attention of the
court to the testimony of William Betts in which he
testified that a ditch extended westward to the lands of
plaintiff as early as 1886. Tr. 180. Howard Stevens
testified that he helped clean out the ditches about every
year; that no one ever questioned the ~ight of he and
his father to use the ditches so far as he knew. Tr. 210.
Edward R. Stevens testified that he did not help
out in the cement dam which is referred to in the evidence as the Duck Creek Dam, but he did help fix it up.
Tr. 11. That no one questioned his right to use the
ditches until 1940. Tr. 63. That he helped put in some
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concrete head gates in the ditches leading frmn the
Duck Creek Dan1. and a wooden eulYert, and a wooden
head gate. Tr. 111. That about 1922 he and Ren Stewart put in a culvert and a wooden headgate a little ·west
of th2 Duck Creek Dam; that a little west and north
of the Duck Creek Dmn, he helped put in three cement
dan1s. Tr. 1:28. That he furnished some of the flash
boards for the Duck Creek Dam which at times he
removed to let the water down to the Stevens Dmn;
that on several occasions he worked on the ditches,
Tr. 1:3:2. That he and Ren Stewart worked on the ditch
that runs north; that they were using a ditcher and the
team ran away and Ren Stewart was injured. Tr. 133.
In the course of our argument, we may find occasion to refer to other evidenc~, but the foregoing statement ·will serve to direct the attention of the court to
plaintiff's theory of what the facts are, as disclosed by
the evidence.
BY THE DECREE APPEALED FROM THE DEFENDANT, DUCK CREEK IRRIGATION COMPANY, WAS
AWARDED MORE THAN A SUFFICIENT PRIMARY
WATER RIGHT TO SUPPLY THE LANDS OF ITS STOCKHOLDERS UNDER THE UPPER DAM.

Throughout its Brief the appellant contends that
the water users under the Upper Dam have a water
right to irrigate their lands which is superior to any
right of the plaintiff and that during the trial plaintiff
conceded that to be so. We again concede that to be so.
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However, the Court in its decree awarded to the defendant a prior right to two second feet which is more than
sufficient to satisfy the prior rights of the stockholders
who divert their water from the Upper Dam. We again
direct the attention of the Court to the testimony of
defendants' witness, Elmer A. Jacob. He testified that
the duty of water on the lands here involved was one
second foot to 70 acres of land. Tr. 433. Counsel for
the plaintiff on cross-examination attempted to get ~fr.
Jacob to admit that it would require more than one
second foot of water for 70 acres if there was not a
constant stream. However, Mr. Jacob insisted that more
than a second foot to 70 acres of land could not be beneficially used on the land of the parties to this litigation.
Tr. 437.
The evidence further shows that about 100 acres
and not to exceed 150 acres of land is and has been irrigated with water diverted from the Upper Dam. See
testimony of o~ R. Stewart. Tr. 627. The fact that about
150 acres of land was irrigated out of the Upper Dam
is further supported by the fact that about 200 shares
of stock in the Duck Creek Irrigation Company was
issued to the water use-rs under the Upper Dam and
two shares were issued to each acre of land that was
being irrigated. Tr. 397 and 628.
In addition to the court awarding the defendant
a prior right to 2 cubic feet per second, the Decree
awards the defendant company and its stockholders
400j568 of the flow of Duck Creek so long as the total
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flow does not exceed a total flow of :28 cubic feet. Thus,
the "\Yater users who divert water from the Upper Dmn
are pennitted to participate in additional water that
may be available for use even though the defendant
con1pany and its stockholders are fully supplied with
a flow of two second feet.
The court having awarded to the defendant company
and its stockholders who divert water from the upper
dam all and more water than the evidence of their expert
witness, Jacob, testified was sufficient, the appellant
has no cause to complain.
It is argued in appellant's brief that the water
which finds its way into Duck Creek below the Duck
Creek Dam is sufficient to supply the needs of the 100
acres of land that the court found is and has been irrigated with water diverted from the Stevens Dam. The
evidence shows that when Jacob made this measurement on June 16 there was only 1.13 second feet of
water available at the Stevens Dam. If 1.13 second feet
of water is sufficient to supply plaintiff's land which
is irrigated from the Stevens Dam, surely the two second
feet of primary right awarded to the defendant is much
more than sufficient to irrigate the approximately 100
acres of land that is irrigated with water diverted from
the Upper Dam. In one breath it is argued that the 1.13
cubic feet of water is sufficient to irrigate 100 acres of
plaintiff's land and in the next breath it is argued that
about four times that quantity of water is necessary to
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irrigate an equal amount of the land of the stockholders
of the defendant company and such claim is made notwithstanding the lands join.
It is somewhat difficult to follow the argument of
counsel for the defendant company touching the water
that finds its way into Duck Creek below the Duck Creek
Dmn. As we understood defendants' position at the trial
they did not claim and never had claimed any right to
the water that finds its way into Duck Creek below Duck
Creek Dam. It was so stated by counsel for the defendant at the trial. Tr. 19. There is thus no issue as to the
water which finds its way into Duck Creek below the
Duck Creek Dam. So also there is no issue as to the
priority of the water beneficially used by the stockholders who divert water from the upper dam. More than
the quantity of water to which such stockholders are
entitled has, as heretofore pointed o~t, been awarded
to the defendant company.
In our view, this controversy in so far as it effects
defendants' appeal resolves itself into the following:
1. After the defendant has been supplied with a
flow of two second feet of water does the evidence support an award to the plaintiff of a right to 168/568 of
the flow of the Benjamin Slough during the period extending from March 1st to December 1st of each year and
to 68/368 of such water from May 1st to August 15th of
each year so long as the water does not exceed twentyeight cubic feet per second.
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•) Does the plaintiff haYe a right to use the ditches
which divert water frmn the Duck Creek to his lands to
carry the water to his land.
If the plaintiff has the right to the use of the water
above indicated, we do not anticipate it will be contended
that if he chooses he n1ay pern1it the water which may
be diverted at the Duck Creek Dam to flow past that
dam and be diverted at the Stevens Dam. Obviously
the defendant company and its stockholders cannot be
injured by such procedure, and if and when .the flow
of water into Duck Creek below the Duck Greek Dam
falls to as low as about one second foot, such a small
quanti(y of water would be of little or no value in use
for irrigation.
We have heretofore,in this brief, directed the, attention of the court to plaintiff's evidence touching the use
of water which his predecessors diverted from the Duck
Creek Dam and the work he did towards maintaining
that dam and the ditches leading therefrom. We shall
not repeat such testimony. Counsel for the defendant
company has directed the attention of the court to certain testimony of the witness, Edward R. Stevens.
The evidence supports the finding of the trial court
to the effect that during low water seasons the water
available from Duck Creek was devoted to raising cultivated crops. No complaint is made of such finding. Apparently counsel for defendant company would have
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
the court believe that the stockholders of the defendant
company irrigated 300 acres of land devoted to the raising of cultivated crops each year. Such a contention is
wholly without support in the evidence. On the contrary,
the evidence is all to the effect that even the land that was
irrigated with water diverted from the Upper Dam and
which had two shares of water for one acre of land was
always short of water during the low water season.
See testimony of Mrs. Hickman, Tr. 390, testimony of
George W. Tucker, Tr. 549 and testimony of 0. R. Stewart, Tr. 672.
Counsel for the defendant company is in error when
he says that Edward R. Stevens never raised more than
30 acres of cultivated crops. On page 64 of the transcript, Mr. Edward R. Stevens testified that he usually
plants 10 acres into oats, and as a rule about thirty or
forty acres into grain, and he put about 80 acres into
grain two years. It is, to say the least, doubtful if under
the evidence in this case a finding to the effect that the
stockholders of the defendant company who diverted
water from the Duck Creek Dam irrigated as much as
100 acres of cultivated crops in any given year with
water so diverted, yet it will be noted that the defendant
company was awarded a water right during the period
extending from May 1st to August 15th on the basis of
the stockholders of the defendant company who divert
water at the Duck Creek Dam devoting 200 acres to the
raising of cultivated crops. The award was on a total
area of 300 acres being devoted to cultivated crops and
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of that acreage 100 acres were irrigated with water
diverted at the Upper Darn. \Ve again direct the attention of the court to the fact that in addition to the proportion of the water awarded to the defendant company,
it was also awarded two second feet whenever the water
fell to or below that amount.
In connection "ith the distinction n1ade by the trial
court in its award of water for cultivated and non-cultivated crops, we digress to observe that so far as we are
advised the use of water to produce hay and grasses
to feed 125 to 200 head of cattle is as much a beneficial
use as it is to use water to produce other crops. Indeed
with the present price of beef it would be fortunate if
more lands were devoted to the raising of livestock.
If, however, the defendant company should have its way
and make the owner of plaintiff's property dependent
upon the consent of defendant to the use of the waters
of Duck Creek and the ditches leading from Duck Creek,
which plaintiff's predecessors have used for more than
half a century, then and in such case plaintiff's lands

would be rendered valueless. If the actions of the officers
of the defendant company denying to plaintiff his right
to course water to his lands is any criterion as to what
to expect in the future, the officers of the defendant company are bent on compelling the plaintiff, and those
who might acquire the property which he is purchasing,
to rely solely on their will as to whether plaintiff and his
successors may or may not continue in the business of
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raising cattle on the property being purchased by the
plaintiff. In this semi-arid west, hay and grasses will
not grow without water.
It appears from the evidence that Stevens has raised
as much as 200 tons of hay in one season in addition
to grain on property which plaintiff is purchasing and
has maintained from 125 to 200 head of cattle thereon.
It is repeatedly stated in appellants' brief that
plaintiff's predecessor in interest sought and secured
the consent of the defendant to use the ditches and water
which was used. Counsel for appellant is in error in
making such statement. So far as the evidence shows
neither the plaintiff nor his predecessors in interest
ever sought or secured the consent of the defendant
company to use either the ditches or the water which
was used. Plaintiff did, just prior to the commencement
of this action, demand from the defendant company
that it permit him to use some water and the ditches,
which demand was refused except on condition that he
make a token payment to the defendant company for use
of the ditches and that the defendant company had water
that it would sell to the plaintiff. Tr. 324 to 326. There
is evidence that on one or two occasions Mr. Stevens
asked the one who was using the water for the same.
Such fact may tend to show that Mr. Stevens was behaving like a good neighbor should by not taking the water
until his neighbor had finished irrigating his land, but
surely Mr. Stevens was not required to engage in any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29

encotmter with his neighbor in order to maintain his
water right. In this connection, it should also be observed that so far as the evidence shows, neither the
defendant nor its stockholders took the water away from
plaintiffs predecessors when they were in the process of
irrigating their crops.
:Jioreover, it is an elementary principle of law in
this jurisdiction that one cannot acquire a right to the
public waters of this state by the mere use thereof.
The use must be beneficial. U.C.A. 1943, 100-1-3 and
cases cited in the foot note. It would be enlightening
to learn how the defendant company acquired a right
to the waters of Duck Creek so that it had water to sell
to the plaintiff. So also would it be enlightening to be
informed as to why it was necessary for the plaintiff
to secure the consent of the defendant company to use
the \Vater of Duck Creek that was not being used or
could not be beneficially used by the defendant or its
stockholders.
It is also repeatedly asserted that the predecessors
of the plaintiff did not assert a right to the use of water
during low water seasons. Edward R. Stevens did so
testify. During the late season there was rarely sufficient
water available to be of any use to irrigate plaintiff's
land. It would have been an idle gesture for the owner
of the property being purchased by the plaintiff to have
demanded water when the water available could not
have reached such property in sufficient quantity to be
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of any benefit. If defendants' witnesses are to be believed
that was the condition that prevailed every year after the
middle of June or the first of July. Tr. 377-406-672.
Indeed on June 16 during the trial when Elmer
Jacob made his investigation of the flow of Duck Creek,
which was within a few days after a heavy rain, there
was only 1.93 second feet being diverted at the Upper
Dam. Tr. 439. On that day there was 2.01 diverted at
the lower dam and the total flow of Duck Creek on that
day was 2.77 second feet. Tr. 440. It will be remembered
that the defendant company is by the decree awarded
a prior right to two second feet.
There is no way of determining just what the various witnesses meant when they referred to low water,
but as we have heretofore pointed out, the evidence
shows that when the flow of Duck Creek got so low that it
was of little or no value to those who diverted water
from the Lower Duck Creek Dam and particularly to
those at the end of the ditches leading from that dam,
the upper land owners used the water because they
were the only ones who could get it onto their lands to
do any good.
The evidence also shows that prior to about :May 1st
to May 15th, depending on the season, there is no demand
for water to irrigate agricultural crops. Tr. 589. The
trial court in its findings took the earlier date of ~fay 1st
when irrigation begins.
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It is a n1atter of cmnn1on knowledge that in operating a farm, the crops planted thereon vary from year
to year, and as different crops are planted the time that
water can be applied Yaries. Thus as the evidence shows,
grasses and wild hay and probably alfalfa can be beneficially irrigated as early as ~larch or April. If perchance land devoted to the raising of gra1n should be
devoted to a pasture for dairy cows, it would be little
short of a calanrity if \Yater could not be used to irrigate such land until ~Iay 1st or 15th because it had theretofore been used for raising grain which had not been
irrigated before ~Iay. If a tract of land has a water
right, cmmnon sense dictates that water should be applied
when the crop growing thereon needs irrigation.
THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANT COMPANY IS ENTITLED TO ANY MORE WATER
THAN WAS AWARDED TO IT.

Under its second point, defendant asserts that it
should be awarded a flow of at least eight second feet
of water at and above the Duck Creek Dam during
low water and twelve second feet as a first and primary
right. Obviously in making such a claim, the testimony
of defendant witnesses, including their expert Elmer
A. Jacob, is to be ignored. The trial court in its findings has gone the limit in determining the amount of
land that has been and at the trial was being irrigated
by the stockholders of defendant company with the
waters from Duck Creek. We have heretofore directed
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cipal witness, Ren f-;tewart, where he stated that when
the Duck Creek Irrigation Company was formed two
shares of stock were awarded to each acre of land that
was being irrigated from the upper dam and one share of
stock to each acre of land that was being irrigated from
the lower dam. It will be seen from the Articles of Incorporation that 437 shares were issued by the Duck Creek
Irrigation Company. (See plaintiff's Exhibit B). If, as
the evidence shows, one-half of such shares went to the
land owners who diverted water from the Upper Dam and
2 shares were issued to each acre of land so irrigated,
there would be 1091;4 acres of land irrigated from the
upper dam and 218lf2 acres irrigated with water from
the lower dam, or a total of 3273;4 acres of land irrigated
by the stockholders of defendant company with water
from the two dams. Notwithstanding such evidence, the
trial court found that the stockholders of the defendant
company were and had been irrigating 300 acres of land
devoted to the raising of agricultural crops and 100 acres
of land devoted to the irrigation of other lands. The
only possible justification for the finding that the stockholders of the defendant company were and had been
irrigating a total of 400 acres was the testimony of
Ren Stewart, defendants' principal witness and one of
its stockholders, that there was about 3 times as much
land irrigated with water diverted at the Duck Creek
Dam as that irrigated with water diverted at the Upper
Dam.
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Thus, if effect is giYen to the testilnony of defendants' expert witness, Jacob, the most that defendant
could clain1 for the 300 acres of land devoted to cultivated crops would be ±.03 second feet. It will be noted
that under the decree appealed from, the defendant is
a\Yarded more than that amount of water and the plaintiff is awarded only water to irrigate 68 acres while the
defendant is awarded water to irrigate 300 acres of
cultivated crops. R. 204. Thus the defendant was awarded a water right to all, if indeed not more land than its
stockholders claim to have irrigated, while the plaintiff
was awarded a water right to only a part of the land
that his witnesses testified had been and was being irrigated. 'Ve shall again revert to this phase of the case
when we come to a discussion of plaintiff's cross assignments of error.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT ONLY JUSTIFIED, BUT
EQUITY REQUIRED IT TO PROVIDE FOR A ROTATION
OF TURNS IN THE USE OF WATER.

It will be noted that by the Decree entered in this
case, the plaintiff was awarded 168/568 and the defendant 400/568 of the waters of Duck Creek up to 28 second
feet and during the season from May 1st to December 1st
plaintiff was awarded 68/368 and the defendant 300/368
of such waters. Obviously, it would be an utter impossibility to divide the water in that proportion and even
if it were the results would be a waste of the water.
If there were at a given time, say four second feet of
water at the Duck Creek Dam and plaintiff should be
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permitted to take 68j368 or less than 1/5 of the flow,
such an award would be a farce. It would require the
constant attention of an engineer to make the division,
and when the division was made the water to which the
plaintiff would be entitled would be wholly valueless
for use of the plaintiff. That our courts may make provision for rotation of water rights finds support in the
following cases: Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company
v. Shurtliff et al., 49 Utah 569, 164 Pac. 856; Fienstermaker v. Jorgensen, 53 Utah 325, 178 Pac. 760; Dameron
Valley Reservoir & Canal Company v. Bleak, 61 Utah
230, 211 Pac. 974. Indeed the defendant company claims
that it has followed that procedure.
PLAINTIFF HAS ACQUIRED A RIGHT THROUGH HIS
PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST TO THE USE OF THE
DITCHES LEADING FROM THE DUCK CREEK DAM TO
HIS LANDS.

If, as we have heretofore pointed out, the plaintiff
has a right to the use of water diverted at the Duck
Creek Dam to irrigate the lands that cannot be irrigated
with water diverted at the Stevens Dam, it follows
that he has a right to the use of the means of conveying
such water to his land.
Counsel for the defendant apparently proceeds on
the theory that the Duck Creek Irrigation Company
not only owns all of the water that finds its way into
Duck Creek, but also owns the ditches which are used
to convey the water to the land which throughout the
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year has been irrigated with such water. It is contended
that the Duck Creek Irrigation Con1pany secured its
right to the use of the ditches by reason of the Articles
of Incorporation of the Duck Creek Irrigation Cmnpany.
If that be its source of title, it has no title to the ditches
for some distance after the water is diverted from Duck
Creek at the Duck Creek Dam. That land was owned
by Eliza Stewart when the Articles of Incorporation
were signed and she was not one of the incorporators.
Tr. 65-!.
~Ioreover,

A. H. Raleigh, plaintiff's predecessor
in title, was awarded a right to course water to irrigate
the lands being purchased by the plaintiff across lands
which \vere then owned by Andrew J. Stewart, Jr. and
across which the ditches now being used to carry water
to the plaintiff's land are located. We again direct
the attention of the court to the Findings, Conclusions
and Decree made and entered in 1896 in the case of A. H.
Raleigh v. A. J. Stewart, Jr. et al. The land across which
the right was granted was secured by Andrew J. Stewart, Jr. from the United States of America (see tenth
page of the instruments certified to by F. M. Alder,
Court Reporter). Counsel is in error when he says
that the only water involved in that litigation was water
that came from the springs north of Payson. In its
findings the Court stated "that plaintiff and defendant
are each entitled to some water from what is known and
described in the pleadings as The Slough or Slough
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mitted the amount of water each or any of the parties
are entitled to." Moreover, one who has a right to course
water across anothers land is not deprived of such right
because perchance, the one who has such right may get
his water from a different source.
Plaintiff however, need not rely on the award made
1n 1896. Having used the ditches since at least 1906,
plaintiff has an easement by perscription. In Utah and
generally, a perscriptive right is acquired by use for a
period of 20 years. North Point Consolidated Irrigation
Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co., 16 Utah 246, 52 Pac.
168, 17 Am. Jur. 968. Nor do we know of authority
which holds that one may not acquire a ~ight to an easement to convey high water across anothers land as well
as low water. The further observation may be made that
under the doctrine announced by this court in the case
of East River Bottom v. Boyce, 102 Utah 149, 128 Pac.
(2d) 277, the execution of the Articles of Incorporation
did not convey to the corporation any easement over the
lands of the incorporators.
It is further argued that the ditches which lead
from the Duck Creek Dam to plaintiff's lands are drain
ditches. So far as appears there was no need of constructing ditches to drain the water from Duck Creek.
Moreover drain ditches are constructed in the low places
of the land to be drained. The ditches leading to and
across the land of the plaintiff are on the high parts of
the land as the trial court must have observed when
viewing the premises.
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THE WATERS THAT ARE EMPTIED INTO DUCK
CREEK FROM THE BENJAMIN DRAINAGE DISTRICT ARE
IN PART 'VATERS THAT FORMERLY FOUND THEIR
WAY INTO THE LANDS BEING PURCHASED BY THE
PLAINTIFF.

There is evidence in this case which tends to show
that the construction of the Benjamin Drainage system
intercepted the underground water that found its way
into the land of plaintiff and thus increased the need
for more water to irrigate such lands, and that the water
so intercepted was emptied int.o Duck Creek and thereby
increasing the flow thereof.
There does not appear to have been a case in Utah
where the question has been raised as to whether or not
the owner of the land which has thus been deprived of
the water which, prior to the construction of the drainage system, found its way to his land has any claim on
such water when as here it is turned into a natural water
course from which it may be diverted to the land from
which it is drained. Colorado has or has had a law
which provides that water gathered by drainage improvements belongs to the land owners in proportion to the
amount assessed against each. See Kinney on Irrigation
and Water Rights, 2nd Ed., Vol. 2, page 3266; see also
the same volume at page 3265 where meadow lands are
protected. ~Inch is said in the case of Wrathall v. Johnson et al., 86 Utah 50, 50 Pac. (2d) 755, which in principle lends support to a similar view, namely that one
may not deprive a land owner of his underground water
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to his damage. Of course, if one's land is drained and
the water so drained is made available to be again applied
on the land, no damage would be likely to result. In this
case the defendant company is seeking to acquire a right
to the water which is emptied into Duck Creek by the
Benjarnin Drainage District, some of which doubtless
served to provide water for the lands of the plaintiff
prior to the construction of the drainage system. However, plaintiff need not rely upon such a basis to establish his water right. Under the evidence in this case,
the plaintiff has established a right to at least the water
awarded to him by the court below and we direct the
attention of the court to the foregoing views to show
the grave injustice that would be sustained by one similarly situated who could not establish a right by the law
applicable to the usual method of appropriation.
So far as appears no one questioned the right of
the plaintiff's predecessors to use the ditches leading
frmn the Duck Creek Dam to irrigate the lands of the
plaintiff until some of the renters of Mr. Stevens failed
to turn the water out of the ditches leading from that
dam. Mr. Payne, the secretary of the defendant company, testified as follows:
That at times there is more than enough
water for everyone.

"Q. It was the ditches that you wanted to be
careful about, that is right, is
A.

it~

Yes, sir.
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Q. \Yell now, :\[r. Payne, if yon were willing to
let him (plaintiff) have the use of these
ditches for $2.00 a year; that was a real
bargain, wasn't it~
~\.

\Yell. we had so n1uch trouble with those who
had been there before flooding the lands, we
wanted to control and the regulations, which
in the past two years we had had trouble.

Q.

~\nd that was what caused all of this fuss,
you had had some trouble with the two renters
of :Jir. Stevens f

A.

They weren't the only ones that ran water
through when the ditches weren't cleaned.

Q. But that was the cause of this whole controversy, because they had flooded you out
down there and you were going to keep people
out of this ditch.
A.

No, we didn't tell him we were going to keep
him out of the ditch." Tr. 719.

To the same effect is the testimony of Carl E. Lindstrom. Tr. 742. Needless to say one does not lose an
easement because he has been guilty of negligence in the
use thereof.
The plaintiff has filed a notice of cross appeal and
a cost bond. We note that under the new rules a cross
appeal is apparently not necessary. See Rule 74 b.
In support of the plaintiff's cross appeal, the following points or Assignments of Error are relied upon:
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POINT ONE

The Trial Court erred in failing to retain jurisdiction of the cause for the purpose of disposing of plaintiff's claim for damages on account of the defendant
unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the use of the water
and ditches to which he was entitled.
POINT TWO

The Trial Court erred in limiting the amount of
land to which plaintiff is entitled to irrigate through the
Duck Creek Dam to 68 acres.
POINT THREE

The Trial Court erred in awarding to Carl Lindstrom a right to irrigate 22 acres of land with water to
be diverted from Duck Creek at the Duck Creek Dam.
POINT FOUR

The Trial Court erred in awarding to Lavon Payne
a right to irrigate 56 acres of land with water to be
diverted from Duck Creek at the Duck Creek Dam.
POINT FIVE

The Trial Court erred in failing to award costs to
the plain tiff.
POINT ONE

It will be seen that by his Complaint the plaintiff
sought to recover a judgment against the defendant
company because of damages he sustained because of
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it refusing and prohibiting the plaintiff from diverting
any water through ditches leading from the Duck Creek
Dam to the lands which he was purchasing. R. 6 and 10.
Dpon that issue, the Court found that the plaintiff was
unlawfully deprived of the use of water from Duck Creek
to be di\erted at the Duck Creek Dam, but that no evidence -was offered to show the damages, if any, that
he had sustained. R. 200.
It is true that no endence was offered tending to
show the damages that were sustained. Obviously any
attempt to show damages until it was determined what
water the plaintiff was entitled to would have been a
useless undertaking. While the record is silent touching
the reason for the failure of plaintiff to offer evidence
as to damages, it is probably proper to refer to the fact
that counsel for the plaintiff mentioned to the court the

fact that it was :first necessary to have determined the
question of the amount, if any, of water that plaintiff
was entitled to receive. \Yithout such determination,
it would be utterly impossible to establish the amount
of damages.
As to. the question of damages, either party was
entitled to a jury. Suppose in this case a jury had been
demanded and impaneled to pass on the matter of damages. Such a jury would have been compelled to wait
more than four years before the question of damages
could be submitted to them. It is for that reason that
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eonrts are required to dispose of the equitable issues
before the legal question can be disposed of. Park v.
Wilkin.'wn et al., 21 Utah 279, 60 Pac. 945.
POINT TWO

The evidence shows that the plaintiff is entitled
to an award of water to irrigate at least 100 acres of
land out of the Duck Creek Dam. We have heretofore
directed the attention of the court to the evidence showing that a number of ditches extended from the Duck
Creek Dam to various parts of the lands of the plaintiff,
and that such ditches were in existence at and before
1906. Also both Mr. Edward R. Stevens and his son,
Howard Stevens, testified at length as to the amount
of land that was irrigated with water diverted from the·
Duck Creek Dam. We shall not again go over such
testimony, suffice it to observe that the amount of land
irrigated from that source was at least 100 acres. Tr.
27,28,51,54,58,73,213,214.
POINTS THREE AND FOUR

Points three and four involve the same question of
law. It will be seen from the findings that the defendant,
Lavon Payne, has acquired land from Eliza Stewart and
has, when water has been available, used water from
the Benjamin Slough to irrigate 56 acres of land owned
by him. The court also found that for more than 20
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years the defendant, Carl Lindstrom, has beneficially
used water from the Benjmnin Slough ~o irrigate 22
acres of land. R. 19-!.
There is no evidence and no cla.im is made that either
:Jir. Payne or :Jir. Lindstrom ever filed on any of the
waters of Duck Creek or that they or either of them
ever acquired a right to the use of the water awarded
to them prior to 1903.
Counsel for the defendant corporation is also counsel for both Payne and Lindstrom. He has argued at
considerable length that a water right cannot be acquired
without a filing in the office of the State Engineer since
1903. It will be interesting for counsel to inform the
court why his argument about the law touching the necessity of making a filing in the office of the State Engineer
since 1903 in order to establish a water right does not
apply to his clients, Payne and Lindstrom.
POINT FIVE

We are mindful that under the law as it existed
when this action was brought it gave to the trial court
a discretion in an equity case to fix the costs. However,
it is well established that when there is a clear abuse of
discretion, an appellant court will review and reverse
the action of the trial court. In this case no claim was
made that the defendant company would sustain any
injury whatsoever if plaintiff received some water to
irrigate his land. According to the evidence, defendant
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company claims to have water to sell. There was also
capacity in the ditches leading from the Duck Creek
Dam which plaintiff could use by the payment of $2.00.
We submit that the judgment should be amended
to the effect that plaintiff be awarded the right to course
water through the ditches leading from the Duck Creek
Dam; that the court below should be directed to permit
the cause to be tried as to damages, if any, that plaintiff
has sustained; that the award of a water right to Payne
and Lindstrom should be reversed and their claim of
a water right be denied and that plaintiff be awarded
a right to irrigate 100 acres of land with water diverted
at the Duck Creek Dam and his costs incurred in the
trial of this cause in the court below and his costs in this
appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

ELIAS. HANSEN,
Attorney for Respondent,
Angus Bishop.

CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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